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Abstract
In the philosophy of science and epistemology literature, robustness analysis
has become an umbrella term that refers to a variety of strategies. One of the
main purposes of this paper is to argue that different strategies rely on different
criteria for justifications. More specifically, I will claim that: i) robustness anal-
ysis differs from de-idealization even though the two concepts have often been
conflated in the literature; ii) the comparison of different model frameworks re-
quires different justifications than the comparison of models that differ only for
the assumption under test; iii) the replacement of specific assumptions with dif-
ferent ones can encounter specific difficulties in scientific practice. These claims
will be supported by a case study in population ecology and a case study in
geographical economics.
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1 Introduction
In the philosophy of science and epistemology literature, robustness analysis has
become an umbrella term that refers to a variety of strategies. Probably also due to
the fact that different taxonomies have been put forward by various authors quite
closely in time (Kuorikoski et al. 2010; Weisberg and Reisman 2008; Woodward
2006), a certain confusion has emerged in the literature, as well as an overlap in the
terminology. Scientists often refer to one sense or the other without specifying their
source, or without mapping their terminology to that of other scientists. More
importantly, the epistemic virtues underlying different senses of robustness analysis
have been often left implicit and their legitimacy as confirmatory tools remains to be
clarified.
It is one of the purposes of this paper to distinguish different epistemological
arguments behind distinct uses of robustness analysis. In so doing, this work
identifies certain gaps between the theoretical characterization of robustness analysis
and its application to scientific practice. First, I will show that robustness analysis
differs from de-idealization even though the two concepts have often been conflated in
the literature. Secondly, that there are different justifications for using robustness
analysis, according to whether it is considered as a strategy to compare different
modeling frameworks or models that differ only as to the assumption being tested.
Finally, that in scientific practice it can be difficult to introduce single changes in a
model without altering its main structure. If robustness analysis were a ‘surgical’
operation, in which controversial aspects could be replaced by different ones with no
other relevant changes, then the role of a single assumption could be evaluated and
the invariance of the results assessed. However, it is often the case that the intimate
connection between simplifying assumptions and mathematical tractability is such
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that variations can often only be introduced by altering the overall structure of the
model. This argument will be supported by a case study in population ecology and a
case study in geographical economics. In what follows, possible solutions to the
previous shortcomings and related difficulties will be examined.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, I introduce the argument for
robustness analysis and present different taxonomies proposed in the literature. In
Sec. 3, drawing on a model in population ecology, I explain how robustness analysis
differs from de-idealization. In Sec. 4, I examine the goal and the import of robustness
analysis as a strategy to compare different mathematical approaches to describing the
same phenomenon. In Sec. 5, I discuss a case study from geographical economics,
which reveals some possible practical difficulties in using robustness analysis. In
Sec. 6, I conclude by pointing out some challenges that robustness analysis faces in
actual scientific practice, which feature as candidate directions for future research.
2 Robustness analysis
Suppose that we have a theoretical model, based on a set of initial assumptions, from
which we can derive a number of predictions. If the initial assumptions are unrealistic
representations of a real-world phenomenon, it is natural to ask how the predictions
can apply to the real-world phenomenon, where these unrealistic assumptions do not
hold. Intuitively, a way of proceeding is to replace the initial assumptions with
slightly different ones, in order to observe whether the result holds true across
conditions. Invariance of the result would suggest that the unrealistic assumptions
were irrelevant to the final result; variation of the result would show that the
predictions were not independent of the specific initial assumptions.
This method of testing whether a result is invariant under different initial
assumptions is known as robustness analysis. The idea behind this strategy is that
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confidence in the predictions of a model increases if the predictions are invariant to
small changes in the assumptions from which they are derived. In a slightly more
formal notation, robustness analysis can be described as follows: we start from a
model M , which consists of a core assumption C and an auxiliary assumption A1,
from which the result R follows. If the same result R occurs respectively under
different auxiliary assumptions A2, A3, A4 etc. we can conclude that changes in the
assumptions do not influence the final result. In other words, if the result is invariant
across conditions, we have an indication that it is the core of the model that is
driving the result rather than the auxiliary assumptions (Kuorikoski et al. 2010).
As an example of robustness analysis, consider Schelling’s segregation model
(Schelling 1978), which describes the dynamics that lead to racial segregation within
social groups.1 Schelling’s model starts from a simplified representation of its target
system: a checkerboard, standing for a certain metropolitan area, and dimes and
pennies, standing for the individuals of two different groups, for example Blacks and
Whites. The main rule of the game is that the individuals on the checkerboard move
from one place to another until the composition of their neighborhood meets their
preferences.
As it turns out, regardless of their initial distribution in the metropolitan area,
Black and White citizens will end up being clustered in different parts of the city, as
a consequence of their preference for having at least half their neighbors of their own
color.2 With respect to robustness, the fact that segregation is shown to follow from
1Racial sorting is only one specific case of segregation. More generally, Schelling’s
model applies to any situation where the individuals have preferences that tend to
generate clusters within social groups, i.e different tastes, social status, sex, language,
age, etc.
2Interestingly, the model predicts segregation not as a consequence of the preference
of the individuals for segregation itself, but as a by-product of their preference for
having some neighbors of the same ethnic group.
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different initial positions provides a robust result, which does not depend on one
specific assumption, i.e. a particular representation of the distribution of the
individuals in space.
The robustness of Schelling’s result has been tested under a number of different
assumptions, other than the initial position. For example, Bruch and Mare (2006)
have shown that segregation occurs under different structures of neighborhood, and
alternative choice functions. Muldoon et al. (2012) have shown that segregation
occurs even when the individuals prefer to be in the minority group of their
neighborhood. In the literature, alternative mathematical approaches to Schelling’s
model have even been explored that are based on analytical methods instead of
simulations (Zhang 2004). The comparison of the results achieved via simulated
models versus analytical ones is a further example of robustness analysis, this time
applied across different mathematical treatments of the problem under analysis.
The different senses of robustness analysis illustrated above can be traced back to
a classification drawn by Weisberg and Reisman (2008), according to which: 1)
parameter robustness refers to variations in the initial conditions or in the value of
the parameters of the model; 2) structural robustness refers to changes in the
variables included in the model; 3) representational robustness refers to modifications
in the mathematical structure in which the model has been implemented, as in the
example of the analytical versus the simulated version of Schelling’s model.
In the context of economic modeling, a further distinction has been introduced by
Kuorikoski et al. (2010), who refer to robustness analysis as a strategy to assess the
role of different tractability assumptions, i.e. different mathematical formulations of
the same factor in a model. The label tractability assumptions was originally
introduced in the literature by Hindriks (2005, 2006, 2012) to indicate assumptions
imposed if the problem at issue cannot be solved or is significantly more difficult to
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solve without them.
From this brief introduction, it should already be evident that a variety of
strategies have been described as robustness analysis.3 4 The attempt to connect one
account with another sheds light on important differences between them that the use
of a similar vocabulary has so far obscured.5
In the philosophy of science literature, robustness analysis as a confirmatory
strategy is at the centre of a contentious debate; the core of the dispute is about
whether this practice is appropriate to guide the comparison between a theory or a
model and the empirical world. According to the critics (Cartwright 1991;
Odenbaugh and Alexandrova 2011; Orzack and Sober 1993; Sugden 2001; Stegenga
2009) robustness analysis is not a method of boosting confidence in an hypothesis.
Above all, they maintain that robustness analysis is a non-experimental method of
inquiry, at odds with the principles of scientific method. According to these
principles, our hypotheses should be tested against the empirical evidence rather than
against a priori reasoning.
3Yet another distinction has been proposed by Woodward (2006) to take account of
the variety of uses of robustness analysis in different scientific domains. He classifies
four kinds of robustness: 1) inferential, 2) derivational, 3) measurement and 4) causal
robustness, according to whether the analysis is conducted 1) to extrapolate inferential
relations from the data through changes in the assumption space; 2) to derive theo-
retical results from models with different assumptions; 3) to measure physical entities
with a family of experimental tools; or 4) to assess the stability of a generalization as
invariant under interventions.
4Note also that robustness analysis is used in other areas of science with yet a
different meaning: e.g, in the study of complex systems, robustness analysis is a method
of quantifying the effect of uncertainty at the level of the parameters on the final
predictions; in statistics, robust estimators are those unaffected by outliers in the data.
A classic reference on robustness in econometrics is Leamer (1983) and in climate
sciences Parker (2011) and Pirtle (2010). In what follows, I will focus on robustness in
theoretical models and not on the literature in statistics.
5For example, robustness analysis in climate models is often cited as an example of
derivational robustness, whereas Woodward classifies it as a case of inferential robust-
ness. For other examples, see Justus (2012).
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According to its advocates, on the other hand, robustness analysis can be an
effective guide in scientific practice (Kuorikoski et al. 2010; Weisberg and Reisman
2008). If a process or event is shown to be invariant across a range of assumptions,
then scientists can omit the details of the problem without this undermining the final
result. This turns out to be a crucial feature in all those areas of science where
scientists cannot know or specify the exact configuration of the system under scrutiny.
A way to reconcile the different positions is to consider the merits that each one
has. In line with its critics, it can be said that robustness analysis has lower
confirmatory power than empirical testing. In line with its advocates, however,
robustness analysis remains the preliminary strategy to assess the results of abstract
mathematical models.
In this paper, I will first spell out different epistemic arguments underlying
different cases of robustness analysis. In so doing, I will investigate the extent to
which robustness analysis is a viable strategy to be used by scientists. In the example
of Schelling’s model, it is straightforward to vary, for instance, the initial position of
the agents on the checkerboard and to observe the result across conditions.
Schelling’s model is often characterized in the literature as an example of a
‘toy-model’, to indicate a very abstract representation that idealizes away the
characterizing features of the real world phenomenon. In Schelling’s case, as well as
in other examples, the single parts of a model can be replaced with different ones as if
they were Lego building blocks. But is robustness analysis an option in scientific
practice, when modelers have to deal with more complex model structures? I will
show that in the case of complex models, whose components are in relation with each
other partly to satisfy analytical requirements, it becomes more difficult to break
them down into single units that can be exchanged with different ones. Even though
this objection does not undermine the validity of robustness analysis under ideal
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conditions, it suggests that an evaluation of robustness analysis is still needed for
those cases where the ideal conditions do not obtain.
3 Robustness analysis and de-idealization
The previous section lists a number of ways in which robustness analysis has been
described in the literature. What is common to a variety of cases is that robustness
analysis is a strategy to increase confidence in the results of theoretical models; also,
that confidence increases through changes in the assumptions of a model and
observation of the consequent effects. The main differences between cases are the
elements that are manipulated and the logic behind their manipulation.
Let us start from the question of why an assumption should be replaced with a
different one. In the philosophy of science, the literature on idealizations,
abstractions, approximations, simplifications etc. is now extensive but it is
uncontroversial across different accounts that unrealistic assumptions are not
problematic per se. With a simple example, consider negligible assumptions, i.e.
assumptions that represent factors that are irrelevant for the phenomenon under
study (Ma¨ki 2009, 2011). A model should not be criticised for being unrealistic with
respect to negligible assumptions. A model is by definition a partial representation of
the target system; what makes a model adequate, at least according to certain
accounts, is that it isolates the causal mechanism that is relevant for the phenomenon
under study (Ma¨ki 2009, 2011). In its most basic sense, robustness analysis is
conducted precisely to test whether the result of a model depends on the putative
causes rather than on possible confounders. To do so, the assumptions are replaced
by different ones, so to test that changes in the final result depend on variations in
the causal factors and not on confounding factors. Note that this is the sense of
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robustness analysis that corresponds to what Weisberg and Reisman call parameter
robustness analysis.
A further reason why an assumption might require modifications is that it leaves
out aspects of the target system that might be relevant for the phenomenon under
study. In such a case, one way to proceed is to relax the problematic assumption so
as to consider the result under a more accurate representation of the target system.6
To illustrate the case, I will refer to Weisberg and Reisman’s discussion of
robustness analysis. In their paper The Robust Volterra Principle, they present a
body of results from the Lotka-Volterra model, i.e. a population abundance model for
a predator species and a prey species, consisting of a pair of coupled first-order
differential equations. One of the most important properties of the Lotka-Volterra
model is known as the Volterra principle, which shows that the introduction of an
external cause of death in the system, such as a pesticide that equally affects the prey
and the predator, determines a relative increase in the abundance of the prey
population.
In the Lotka-Volterra model, unrealistic assumptions are, e.g., that populations
are treated as continuous, that they are infinite, that time is continuous, etc. (see
Colyvan (2013) for this and similar examples). These assumptions are said to be of
the tractability kind, to indicate that they are mainly adopted for reasons of
mathematical tractability.7
6Note, however, that this does not imply that the only way to validate a model
is gradually to add assumptions that better characterise the phenomenon of interest.
There might be highly idealized models that are adequate on a number of grounds
(see e.g. Batterman 2008; Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2011; Knuuttila 2011; Sua´rez 2010). Here,
however, we are considering the situation in which the replacement of an assumption
is called for, because it omits aspects of the target system that should be included in
the model.
7As with the concept of robustness analysis, so also ‘tractability assumption’ is a
heavily loaded term. According to Colyvan 2013, the effect of the assumptions adopted
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Suppose it were not possible to quantify the error that these assumptions entail.
In this case, one way to increase confidence in the validity of the model is to test the
results under more realistic assumptions than the initial ones. Consider how the
Lotka-Volterra model includes time as a tractability assumption in population
dynamics. According to Colyvan and Ginzburg (2003, 72-3): ‘Our view, in fact, calls
for discrete equations, where time is treated discretely. These equations, however, are
notoriously hard to deal with. We therefore continue to use differential equations, but
we bear in mind that these are idealizations of the underlying finite, discrete-time
model’.
Here, not only is it expected that both mathematical treatments, i.e. discrete and
differential equations, would provide results that are largely in agreement, if
differential equations are a good enough representation of the phenomenon under
analysis; more importantly, confidence in the validity of results increases once a more
accurate mathematical treatment is provided for the system under analysis. When it
is so, then the more accurate formulation becomes the benchmark by which to assess
the validity of the results; it is not the invariance of the result that increases
confirmation of the result itself. This is because, if the results were not consistent,
this would reveal certain problematic aspects of the original assumption.
But the replacement of a particular assumption with a more realistic one is based
on different epistemological criteria than the standard argument for robustness
analysis. When we replace an unrealistic assumption with a more realistic
for reasons of mathematical tractability is often negligible; for instance, nobody would
criticize the result of the Lotka-Volterra model because it relies on continuous popu-
lations. Hindriks (2006), on the other hand, regards tractability assumptions as those
whose effects are presumably non-negligible for the final result. In turn, Ma¨ki (2011)
has questioned the non-negligible features attributed to tractability assumptions. Over-
all, I will use the term in its general sense to indicate assumptions that omit aspects
of the target system in order to facilitate mathematical tractability.
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assumption, what we are doing is known in the literature as the de-idealization of a
model. This method has been largely discussed in the philosophy of science and in
epistemology and it raises questions that are tangential to robustness analysis (see
e.g. Batterman 2008; Cartwright 1999; Ma¨ki 2011; McMullin 1985; Odenbaugh and
Alexandrova 2011). Examples of such questions are, how de-idealization should
proceed, or what is the appropriate level of idealization according to the different
nature and aims of the inquiry.
Robustness analysis is a different strategy from de-idealization. In robustness
analysis, it is because different assumptions, none of which is more realistic than
another, all determine the same result, that we claim that the unrealistic aspects of
the assumptions do not compromise the validity of the model. This is the sense in
which ‘our truth is at the intersection of independent lies’, as the famous biologist
Richard Levins affirmed when introducing the notion of robustness analysis in the
literature (Levins 1966, 423). When we replace a tractability assumption with a more
realistic one, we are not working within a network of models or assumptions, each of
which controls for different aspects of the problem under consideration. Here, our
truth is neither at the intersection of different lies, nor are these lies independent.
Levins’ idea refers instead to a situation in which we have a collection of models,
which either stand or fall together, since each of them tackles specific aspects of the
problem under analysis.
Despite its different underlying justifications, robustness analysis has often been
referred to as a strategy to increase confidence in the validity of a model by showing
that the result is invariant under more realistic representations of the system under
analysis. Weisberg and Reisman’s notion of structural robustness reflects this intent,
as exemplified by the analysis of Schelling’s result against refined utility functions, or
of the Volterra principle under the density dependence parameter (Weisberg and
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Reisman 2008).
A further example comes from evolutionary game theory. Here, a standard
objection to the validity of certain results about the emergence of cooperative
behaviors is based on their alleged lack of robustness with respect to the individuals’
cognitive constraints (Skyrms 1996; Sugden 1986; D’Arms et al. 1998). A limitation
on the kind of possible strategies that can be transmitted across generations is the
cognitive load they impose on individuals; thus, a result will not be considered
significant if it is not robust under a model that takes these limitations into account.
In the above cases, confidence in the validity of the result increases as more
realistic models are adopted. Robustness analysis, by converse, is not a process of
‘concretization’ of the model. In robustness analysis, unrealistic assumptions are
replaced by other unrealistic assumptions in order to test the extent to which the
final result of the model depends on them. On the one hand, this implies that the
possibility cannot be ruled out that the further unrealistic assumptions might be
affecting the final result. On the other hand, however, in abstract mathematical
models, both from physics and economics, it is often the case that the level of
theoretical abstraction is such that it is difficult to assess their validity in terms of the
accuracy with which they represent the target system. Credible and unrealistic
aspects are intertwined with one another to an extent that makes it inappropriate to
talk about de-idealisation when replacing any of them with different ones. In these
circumstances, robustness analysis does not deal with the realism or truth of the
assumptions. In these cases, the underlying idea is that if a result is invariant across
conditions, then the result does not strictly depend on the particular way in which
the assumptions represent the target system, and thus on their falsifications.
Regardless of the position that one takes on the argument for robustness analysis,
conflating it with de-idealization creates a terminological as well as a conceptual
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confusion. Terminologically, if robustness analysis is taken as a synonym for
de-idealization, the original definition by Levins no longer applies. Conceptually, the
overlap of the two notions obscures the fact that the alleged confirmatory power of
the two methods relies on different grounds. In the next section, by looking at an
example of how scientists conduct robustness analysis, we unravel some of the
philosophical confusion but at the same time some practical problems come to light.
4 Across-models robustness analysis
In the previous section, I introduced the problem of tractability assumptions in the
Lotka-Volterra model. Ideally, if there are no other ways to justify their adoption,
tractability assumptions should be replaced by more realistic ones. However,
de-idealization is often not an easy matter. In the Lotka-Volterra model,
mathematical assumptions are adopted precisely because it is not clear how to
proceed otherwise. In these circumstances, it is also difficult to replace them with
other tractability assumptions. Continuous populations, infinite populations and
continuous time require to be exchanged with assumptions such as discrete or finite
populations, or discrete time. A different way to proceed in these cases is by
comparing models that differ from one another along multiple lines. This type of
robustness analysis corresponds to what Weibserg and Reisman (2008) define as
representational robustness analysis, i.e. a test of the invariance of predictions across
different mathematical approaches.
With respect to representational robustness, the predator-prey interaction has
been analyzed both via differential equations and computational simulations and it
has been shown that the Volterra principle holds in both cases. By deploying
different modeling frameworks, i.e. a population-level model (differential equations)
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and an individual-based model (simulations), Weisberg and Reisman (2008) compare
two different mathematical approaches for the analysis of predator-prey interaction.
Let us consider in more detail the purpose of this comparison.
In biology-related disciplines, individual-based models are becoming increasingly
common despite the lack of analytical results. This is mainly because the degree of
specificity they enable scientists to achieve is higher than that achievable via previous
standard analytic treatments, such as differential equations as in the Lotka-Volterra
model. The question for robustness analysis is what to expect from a comparison of
the results from the population-level and the individual-based models. Are the
assumptions of one mathematical framework being tested, using another framework
that does not take the same assumptions into account? What exactly is it, that is
being compared across cases?
Consider again a mathematical assumption in the Lotka-Volterra model, such as
that populations are continuous, not discrete. Is the individual-based model testing
the effect of this assumption on the result? Strictly speaking, the effect of the
continuous populations assumption in the Lotka-Volterra model can be tested when
adopting the assumption of discrete populations, which is possible once the original
tractability problem has been solved.
On the one hand, the fact that an individual-based model which is based on
discrete populations gives the same result as the Lotka-Volterra model is an
indication that the Volterra principle can also be derived under the assumption of
discrete populations. On the other hand, however, when translating the
Lotka-Volterra model into an individual-based model, many aspects of the initial
model change. The changes come within an entirely new modeling ‘package’, whose
assumptions will have to be tested in turn. Note that the more aspects have been
changed, the further we are from analyzing the effect of one specific assumption.
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The above claim can be illustrated with an example from Schelling’s model.
Suppose that a modeler were interested in testing whether two different network
structures have different impacts on segregation. The two network structures differ
from one another in the number of neighbors that the individuals take into account
when making their decision to move on the checkerboard. Suppose that, apart from
the network structures, the two models were alike. By simulation, the result proves to
be invariant across conditions, which indicates that the differences between the two
assumptions do not have relevant effects on the final result.
When the comparison is between an individual-based model and a
population-based model we are in a different situation. Here we are not testing the
effect of one single change in the assumptions. In this case, we are comparing two
models that differ not only in the assumption that we wanted to test, but in that one
plus many others. This is because–at least at the moment–we are only able to include
discrete populations within a entirely different modeling structure. This means that,
whenever we are testing the invariance of results across conditions, we always test the
original tractability assumption plus a number of other assumptions that are implied
by the new one. Hence, whether or not the results are in agreement, we cannot
conclude that this provides an indication about the role of the original tractability
assumption. The result has to be taken as determined by the model as a whole, not
as a case of robustness analysis where a single or a few assumptions have been
replaced with a different one to assess their impact on the result.
An objection to the above claim is that it does not really matter that several
elements change from one model to another, if the result is invariant across conditions.
In other words, if two models differ in many respects, and still the result is invariant,
this provides an even stronger indication of the validity of the result, regardless of
whether the target system is more accurately represented by one model or the other.
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Notice, however, that the argument just outlined is grounded on other
considerations than the standard argument for robustness analysis. If we take the
comparison of entirely different whole models as an instance of robustness analysis,
then the confirmatory power of this strategy no longer derives from what it has
hitherto claimed to be (Kuorikoski et al. 2010; Levins 1966; Odenbaugh 2011).
Robustness analysis has been described as a practice of building models of the same
phenomenon, which differ slightly from one another, so as to identify which
assumptions are necessary for deriving the final result. This is done on the basis that
the results that are robust across conditions depend on the shared, rather than on the
different assumptions. According to Lehtinen (forthcoming): ‘If a result is robust,
only the assumptions that overlap between the models could be needed for its
derivation, and the other assumptions are shown to be dispensable.’
This is not the case for the simulated version of the Lotka-Volterra model. Here,
Weisberg and Reisman (2008) had to introduce new factors, such as a density
dependence parameter, in order to get results, which were only comparable with the
population-based model. In fact, a situation in which very different models provide
the same result is quite a fortunate case, probably an exception in science. At that
point, the problem becomes that of assessing which result is more accurate on the
basis of the different merits of each model.
The example above illustrates in simple terms a problem under discussion among
scientists working with complex simulation models. In the assessments of climate
sciences models, we find that experts are cautious about the possibility of comparing
the results of models that differ from one another in a number of different elements.
According to Parker (2006, 350): ‘Complex climate models generally are physically
incompatible with one another–they represent the physical processes acting in the
climate system in mutually incompatible ways’. According to Lenhard and Winsberg
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(2010, 258): ‘The complexity of interaction between the modules of the simulation is
so severe that it becomes impossible to independently assess the merits or
shortcomings of each submodel’.
In conclusion, the question of how to compare substantially different models
differs from robustness analysis defined as a method of testing the effect of
controversial assumptions by replacing them with single different ones. The
comparison of different modeling frameworks needs further investigation and the
subject opens new challenges that are already attracting the efforts and the attention
of scientists, challenges that are however different from the comparison of models that
differ only with respect to the assumption under analysis. In these cases, the
differences between models are several and such that it is not clear how to map the
different components with one another. When it is so, is it an open question whether,
and on what grounds, the robust results are mutually supporting each other. In the
next section, I will return to the initial problem of how to replace a particular
assumption in isolation with a case study in geographical economics.
5 Robustness analysis and tractability assumptions
In the previous sections, I have first shown that robustness analysis differs from
de-idealizations; and then, that when the replacement of a particular assumption in
isolation is not a viable option, an underdetermination problem occurs concerning
how to compare models that differ from one another along multiple lines. In this
section, I will present a case-study from geographical economics which again provides
insights into the actual process of model manipulation and into the possibility of
changing single assumptions in isolation.
In the literature on robustness analysis, a paradigmatic case study comes from
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the literature in geographical economics (Kuorikoski et al. 2010; McCann 2005;
Neary 2001). Geographical economics is at the centre of a debate between economists
and philosophers of science precisely because of the tractability assumptions on which
it is based (see below). Broadly speaking, geographical economics is a sub-field of
economics that studies the relation between economic activity and spatial location.
The model at the centre of the debate is known as the Core-Periphery model; it was
formulated by Paul Krugman in 1991 and earned him the Nobel prize for economics
in 2008.
The Core-Periphery model investigates the conditions under which an economic
activity agglomerates in a certain region (the core), as against the conditions under
which it disperses (the periphery). Various factors influence this process. The forces
affecting geographical concentration depend on the advantages of being in a region
with good access to the market as against the advantages of being in a region where
competition is lower and there is no risk of market congestion. A key factor is the
cost of transporting goods from the place of production to that of delivery. The
higher the transportation costs, the nearer the economic activities to the place of
demand and, contrariwise, the lower the transportation costs the farther the
economic activity from the centre.
In the history of geographical economics, Krugman’s contribution was crucial in
determining a paradigm shift from previous theories of international trade, which
were based on tariff costs. The advancement in the field was attained thanks to the
introduction of an ‘iceberg’ costs function, which is so called because it is based on
the principle that part of the goods ‘melts away’ when transferred from the place of
production to the place of delivery.
Even though the ‘iceberg’ formulation is obviously a theoretical construct, i.e. it
is not based on direct observation, still it is considered to be appropriate mainly for
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two reasons: first, it reflects the idea that goods are costly to transport; secondly, it
enables the formulation of transport factors not as a separate component of the
model but as part of the goods themselves. This is the sense in which the ‘iceberg’
cost function is a tractability assumption. Since it would be problematic to introduce
additional factors into the model to account explicitly for the diminishing value of the
goods, the mathematical trick is to do as if a lesser amount of goods would arrive at
their destination. In the words of Krugman: ‘In terms of modeling convenience, there
turns to be out a spectacular synergy between [...] market structure and ‘iceberg’
transport costs: not only can one avoid the need to model an additional industry, but
because the transport cost between two locations is always a constant fraction of the
free-on-board price, the constant elasticity of demand is preserved’ (Krugman 1998,
11).
In the geographical economics literature, some of the features of the
Core-Periphery model are a matter of debate. According to Fingleton and McCann
(2007, 168) for instance: “Geography enters these models [economic geography
models] specifically and only via the Krugman adaptation of the Samuelson (1952)
model, the properties of which are implausible and counter to most observed
evidence.” In response to this and other difficulties, in subsequent formulations of the
Core-Periphery model, geographical economists have tried to measure how sensitive
the predictions are to the ‘iceberg’ assumption. To do so, the attempt has been made
to test the results under different functions that do not show the same problematic
aspects. The main problem is that the functions that differ from the ‘iceberg’
function, by not showing the same contended properties, are difficult to implement in
the Core-Periphery model, which is what a test of robustness would require.
One of the most controversial aspects of the Core-Periphery model is the
convexity of the price function. The convexity of the price function is derived from
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the way in which price, value and quantity of goods are defined in geographical
economics and combine together in the Core-Periphery model. It is not guaranteed
that if a certain feature such as ‘price increases convexly with distance’ needs to be
tested, then a model can be built where the feature ‘price is concave with distance’ is
introduced while all the rest remains as before. The convexity of transportation costs
follows from the mathematics of the model as a whole.
In fact, one of the reasons why the ‘iceberg’ cost function was initially introduced
was indeed to enable the mathematical tractability of a certain problem. This
assumption accommodates the analytical requirements of the model, such as
increasing returns to scale, imperfect competition and constant elasticity of
substitution. Because of the very features of this assumption, it is particularly
difficult to replace it with a different one, and leave the rest of the model untouched.
A further consideration is that a model that differed from the initial one, by
showing concave price with distance, would not maintain the crucial properties of the
Core-Periphery model, i.e concentration of the economic activity in the Core versus
dispersion in the Periphery. This is because high transportation costs exert a
counterbalance to agglomeration, which is crucial for the interplay of centrifugal and
centripetal forces in equilibrium formation (McCann 2005).
A different strategy would be to prove that other theoretical frameworks, not
based on ‘iceberg’ transportation costs, produce similar results to those of the
Core-Periphery model, thereby providing independent evidence. However, according
to McCann: ‘It is almost impossible to provide direct comparisons between models
with the ‘iceberg’ assumption and those with other sets of transport costs
assumptions embedded in them. [...] This is because these more traditional transport
costs functions are analytically incompatible with new-economic geography models’
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(McCann 2005, 312).8
Theories in international trade that differ from the geographical economic model
have not been as successful as the Core-Periphery model in terms of equilibrium
analysis, so that at the moment there is no theoretical alternative available, with
which the results of the Core-Periphery model can be compared. This brings us back
to the problem discussed in the previous section: when the results of different models
embedded in different mathematical frameworks are tested against one another, a
way has to be found to map their constituents for the comparison of the results to be
meaningful.
In line with this analysis, the reaction of the scientific community to the
shortcomings of the ‘iceberg’ cost function was indeed an effort to build models that
were not based on the same problematic assumption. For instance, according to
Isard: ‘The first advance [in space economy] would involve dropping the iceberg
assumption regarding transport cost.’ (Isard 1999, 383). Also, in 2009, the World
Bank Development Report was dedicated to geographical economics and there we
find: ‘By using techniques that essentially assumed away the internal workings of
transport [...] the more critical policy-related aspects also have been assumed away.’
(World Bank Report 1999, 185). These quotations are to show that the response of
economists to the shortcomings of the model was to make progress on how to avoid
tractability assumptions in the first place.
The case-study discussed above shows a particular way in which robustness
8Note that there is also a conceptual difference between geographical economics
and the theories of international trade. Theories of international trade are said to
be aspacial, insofar as the effect of distance only comes into play as a tariff cost.
Models in geographical economics, by contrast, include geography as a component
that determines increasing costs in the goods traded. This also explains why the two
frameworks do not have corresponding elements that can be clearly referred one to
another.
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analysis can go wrong. A single counterexample does not undermine robustness
analysis across the board. The strategy can still be successful in evaluating models
that differ in some specific aspects from one another. The question is to what extent
the very concept of tractability assumptions poses a limit to the possibility of
replacing them in isolation. This depends on how we interpret the concept of
tractability assumptions. If the set of tractability assumptions is stretched so far as
to include all kinds of assumptions, insofar as they represent factors in a way that has
to be tractable in some sense, then the problems highlighted above are restricted to
some extreme cases. However, if there is something specific about tractability
assumptions, in that they have a particular mathematical role in a model, as in the
geographical economics case or in the Lotka-Volterra example, then their replacement
with specific different ones might be problematic for the very reasons why they have
been used at the outset. Consider for instance how Colyvan defines this kind of
assumptions: “These idealisations are usually invoked in order to employ familiar and
well-understood mathematical machinery.” (2013, 1339). Implied in this statement is
that we do not use different mathematical machinery because it is not as well
understood as the one that we use. Or, consider how Morrison discusses
mathematical abstractions: “In situations like this where we have mathematical
abstractions that are necessary for arriving at a certain result there is no question of
relaxing or correcting the assumptions in the way we de-idealize cases like frictionless
planes and so on; the abstractions are what make the model work.” (2009, 110). Here,
the replacement of a mathematical assumption is not even considered as a possibility.
Overall, several different accounts have been put forward in the literature
concerning the status of tractability assumptions and their role in a model. There is a
continuum of cases that ranges from assumptions considered to be innocuous, to
assumptions that cannot be relaxed, to assumptions that are assumed in spite of their
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unrealistic features. The claim defended here does not hinge on the peculiarities of
any specific position. Across cases, the possibility has to be considered that, if we
conceive of models as systems of inter-connected parts, then it is reasonable to expect
that changes in certain aspects of the model will in turn determine further changes in
other aspects of the model, in a chain of related effects. This is especially the case for
assumptions introduced partly for the purpose of satisfying certain analytical
requirements dictated by the formal structure of the model. The adoption of this
kind of assumptions turns out to play a crucial part in a variety of cases of model
building. Thus, it is particularly urgent to think of novel criteria for the assessment of
models that rely on their use.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to investigate the epistemic goal of robustness analysis in
theoretical models and to spell out the details of the procedure in scientific practice.
In philosophy of science, robustness analysis is defended as a method of testing the
invariance of a model’s results under different assumptions. As argued in this paper,
several different reasons underlie the replacement of an assumption with a different
one. One reason is that an assumption represents a possible confounding factor; by
changing it, a modeler tests whether the result depends on the mechanism identified
as responsible for the phenomenon and not on possible confounders. Another reason
is that an assumption omits aspects of the target system that might be relevant for
the phenomenon under study. In this case, a possible strategy is to replace that
assumption with a different one, so as to assess the results across conditions. In this
paper, two examples have been presented–one in population ecology and one in
geographical economics–in which the replacement of an assumption with a different
23
one requires to change the model in more than the aspect under test. Comparing
substantially different models, however, is based on other considerations than
comparing models that differ only with respect to a few assumptions. Furthermore,
just as different experimental practices might lead to different results, thereby raising
the question of how to interpret these results (Stegenga 2009), the same is true of
predictions deriving from models with different initial assumptions. The problem of
how to compare results deriving from structurally different models is one of the most
interesting questions that the debate on robustness analysis has opened to today’s
scientific practice and promising works are expected to come from this research area
in the near future.
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